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Do Corporate Managers Time Stock Repurchases 
Effectively? 
 
 
Michael Lorka 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the performance of share repurchases completed by corporate managers, and 
compares the implied performance of the purchases to a mythical alternative investment in the S&P 500 
index, and the company’s industry sector. The “repurchase” portfolio benefits from managers’ significant 
information advantage over all other market participants. The data was collected from Compustat, and 
return, risk and risk adjusted metrics were calculated to provide a comparison of the two portfolios. 
Overall, the portfolio of repurchasing companies experienced lower returns than the broad index and 
respective industry sector, but the volatility for repurchasers was lower as well.  
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Do Corporate Mangers Time Share Repurchases 
Effectively?  
 
Introduction 
 Open market repurchases are a popular method for companies to distribute excess 
cash to shareholders. Corporate managers are charged with acting in the best interest of 
shareholders, which may include repurchasing company shares when they are considered to be 
undervalued, and issuing shares when values are deemed to be high. Managers who make timing 
mistakes risk repurchasing shares when valuations are high. They instead could be using the cash 
to make positive net present value investments or other higher yielding allocations. This paper 
considers that in terms of share repurchase decisions, corporate managers can be viewed as 
active portfolio managers of their own stock. The retrospective analysis examines whether actual 
share repurchases were the best equity investment the company could have made at the time.  
Managers should be able to determine if the companies’ shares are attractive investments 
given their access to non-public information. The timetable for the performance period is from 
January 2005 to December 2014, which includes the equity market peak in 2007, the equity 
market crash in 2008, and the recovery through the end of 2014.  
The principal finding for the study is that corporate managers are not typically able to 
outperform the sector index in which their companies reside. However, the portfolio of 
repurchasing companies’ stock is less volatile than the index.   
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Literature Review 
 Literature related to share repurchases starts with the seminal paper by Vermaelen 
(1981). He examines the price behavior of firms that bought back their shares in the open market 
or via tender. Vermaelen tests four main hypotheses, and the most substantial finding is the 
informational or signaling hypothesis. With the signaling hypothesis, a manager initiates a share 
repurchases and thus signals to investors that either the manager views the stock as undervalued, 
or growth will be slowing and the company stock is the most efficient use of cash. This effect 
can go either way; a positive signal could mean that the management has secured a favorable 
contract and that the true value of the firm is not reflected in the market. A negative signal could 
indicate that there are no better uses of cash, and if company growth is slowing or contracting the 
share price could act negatively. This paper spurred further investigation into signaling theory, 
which is also motivated by the increased popularity of open market purchases by companies.  
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) find that announcement of a new share repurchase 
program produces a 3.5% average abnormal return. The announcement, over the long run, does 
not increase the share price. Share price increases are associated with only open market 
repurchases that actually occur. This situation is distinct from that of firms that announce open-
market repurchase programs but do not follow through with actual stock repurchases. Stephens 
and Weisbach (1998) investigate the actual share reacquisitions associated with open-market 
repurchase programs. They estimate that 74%-82% of the target shares are actually repurchased 
in a typical open market program. They also find an inverse relation between the amount of share 
repurchase and contemporaneous share performance. Further, the cash position of the company 
is positively correlated with the amount of repurchases.  
The fact that share repurchases as associated with significant stock price effects raises a 
question of whether they signal the level of subsequent corporate operating performance. Nohel 
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and Tarhan (1998) examine the relation between share repurchases and operating performance to 
distinguish between competing signaling and free cash flow hypotheses. The findings, conducted 
using annual data, show that performance improvements are relatively minor improvements. 
Nohel and Trahan conclude that investors correctly anticipate that repurchasing firms improve 
operating performance.  Lie (2005) investigates firms’ return on assets (ROA) following a share 
repurchase announcement. Lie improves on Nohel and Tarhan’s work by demonstrating that 
operating performance should be measured on a quarterly basis. He focuses on +4 to +8 quarters 
relative to the repurchase announcement. Lie also examines the operating performance of 
companies that announce share repurchase programs but do not actually repurchase shares. He 
finds that operating performance improvements become detectable within the first two quarters 
after repurchase announcement and persist for two years after. Lie also finds that equity markets 
respond more favorably to earnings releases after repurchase announcements due to improving 
operating performance.  
Hua (2005) examines the effects of share repurchases outside of the US equity market. 
Hua focuses on Hong Kong stock exchange-listed firms announced a share repurchase and then 
actually repurchased shares. Hua looks at short term (21 plus/minus) effects, and concludes that 
the market responds favorably to repurchase announcements done by firms with high book-to-
market ratios. Moreover, he finds that repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive abnormal 
operating performance in the short or long term. More recently, Caton, Goh, and Lee (2016) look 
at the relation between corporate governance and post-repurchase performance. They examine 
the governance style of the corporation and relate it to the extent to which the firm made actual 
share repurchases. The findings are that a firm with a high corporate governance score are more 
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likely to successfully repurchase shares after an announcement, compared to low governance 
firms that are more likely to initiate or raise dividends.  
Leng and Noronha (2013) examine information and long-term stock performance after 
actual share repurchases occur. Leng and Noronha examine this in the context of signaling 
theory, in which  a manager can have advance notice of good news before the public does. The 
conclusion of the paper is that abnormal returns are typically observable after a share repurchase 
announcement and repurchase of actual shares, and there is a correlation between the 
unobservable private information and the abnormal share returns.  
In a study that is closest in theme to this thesis research, Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007) 
examine whether managers are able to time the market with their corporate share repurchases. 
The authors create and test the “pseudo-market timing hypothesis,” which describes a situation 
when managers of a firm believe their share price is undervalued and they are likely to 
repurchase shares. Their evidence shows that managers have the ability to repurchase shares 
when the market valuation is low relative to intrinsic value, but managers typically do not make 
actual share repurchases in these cases. Overall, their findings do not support the pseudo-market 
timing hypothesis. Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee use Compustat and identify preferred stock 
issuances, and repurchases to determine if managers repurchase shares when intrinsic value is 
low, and issue equity in the form of preferred shares or common equity when intrinsic value is 
high. Since they determine that managers of firms have the ability to become active managers, 
this paper will be examining the performance of shares repurchased compared to an index and 
industry index.  
The current study builds on and updates this previous research by extending the sample 
of corporate share repurchasers to the most recent year. The paper is organized as follows. The 
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next two sections contain the hypothesis followed by the data collection strategy. The next 
section contains the empirical analysis, followed by the paper’s conclusion.  
 
Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis for this study can be stated as follows. 
 
H0: The implied excess returns earned on the share repurchases of corporate managers is not 
greater than zero. 
H1: The implied excess returns earned on the share repurchases of corporate managers is greater 
than zero.  
 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data for S&P 500 companies as of January 2016 are retrieved from Compustat. The 
variables of interest include quarterly number of shares repurchased, average price of shares 
repurchased, and the closing price of the shares at the end of the quarter. The number of shares 
repurchased multiplied by the average price indicate the total cash cost of repurchasing shares. 
The price performance (return) of the shares is calculated as the percent of change in share price 
from the previous quarter. Dividends are excluded from the analysis.  
The next step is to obtain S&P 500 returns, and S&P 500 sector returns from Compustat.  
The companies’ GICS codes are then determined, and returns are estimated for a GICS-based 
industry portfolio of stocks as well as the S&P 500 index. The S&P 500 and sector price 
performance (return) is calculated as the percent change in share price from the previous quarter. 
The Real Estate sector of the S&P 500 is excluded due to the sector splitting from financials in 
August of 2016 and there is little historical data on the performance of Real Estate.  
The entire S&P 500 repurchases for one quarter are summed (base year), then the 
individual repurchase are multiplied by one plus the return of the company of the next quarter, 
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and finally the product is summed (base multiplied by return). This process is repeated for each 
quarter. Another data set is made where the base year is then multiplied by the return on the 
index or sector index. A geometric mean for one, three, five, and ten years of the company return 
and the index return data points are calculated.  In addition to a geometric mean, an arithmetic 
and money weighted returns are calculated for 10 years. Sharpe ratio and Sortino ratio are 
calculated as measures of risk adjusted return.  
Data is then extracted from Prof. Kenneth French’s website to obtain the three Fama-
French model factors quarterly from January 1st 2005 to December 31st 2014. The data is used in 
a regression comparing the return performance of the share repurchase portfolios to the Fama-
French factor returns. This is then used to calculate the multifactor alpha for all the repurchase 
portfolios.  
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Empirical Analysis: 
Exhibit 1 shows the cumulative value of $100 invested in January 2005 in the sector 
repurchase portfolios compared to $100 invested in the respective indexes.  
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Exhibit 1: Value of $100 Invested January 2005 in Sector Portfolios
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UTILITY Repurchasers UTILITY INDEX
S&P Repurchases
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Exhibit 2 shows the same series for the S&P 500 companies overall – a portfolio of the stocks of 
repurchasing firms versus all stocks in the index. The performance of $100 invested in the 
mythical repurchase portfolio is shown in blue, and the S&P 500 passive investment is shown in 
red. Based on the graph, it appears that the repurchase portfolio and the index portfolio do not 
differ in cumulative value, and ultimately the ten-year return is only a 3 bps difference. The 
index portfolio does appear more volatile compared to the repurchase index, a question that is 
addressed later.  
 
 
 Since the financial sector portfolio of repurchasing company greatly outperformed the 
financial sector index, it is important to examine the S&P 500 excluding financials. The financial 
crisis was a one-time event during the study period. Additional research expanding the dataset 
time series to longer than 10 years would lessen the importance of the financial crisis in the 
analysis.  
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Exhibit 3: Value of $100 S&P 500 ex Financials
S&P Repurchases ex Financials S&P INDEX
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 Exhibit 4 shows the energy index outperformed the energy repurchase portfolio over the 
ten years; however, it appears that the energy repurchase portfolio produced less-volatile returns. 
A possible explanation for the underperformance of the energy companies is that they were 
operating during a time of high energy prices, and energy companies found that investing in 
assets led to a higher return than repurchasing shares. Since the more successful energy 
companies were likely investing in fixed assets rather than using cash for share repurchases, the 
repurchase portfolio did not fully capture the increase in share price.  
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Exhibit 4: Energy Sector GICS=10: Value of $100
ENERGY Repurchasers ENERGY INDEX
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 Exhibit 5 shows the material sector ultimately outperforms the material index over the 
ten-year period.  The outperformance started during quarter 3 of 2011. The index return also 
appears to be more volatile than the repurchase return. Material companies most likely allocated 
capital towards repurchasing shares at low market values since outperformance starts in 2011, 
when the economy was starting to expand again after the financial crisis. 
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Exhibit 5: Material Sector GICS=15: Value of $100
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 Exhibit 6 shows that the repurchase portfolio underperformed the industrial index, and it 
appears that the growth of the $100 portfolio is less volatile for the repurchasing portfolio rather 
than the index.  
 
 Exhibit 7 shows that the consumer discretionary repurchasing portfolio seems to closely 
track the consumer discretionary index, but with less volatility. This could be due to companies 
like Disney that hold a large portion of the index, and that repurchase shares often.  
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 Exhibit eight shows that the consumer staples repurchase portfolio underperformed the 
consumer staples index.  
 
 Exhibit 9 shows that the healthcare portfolio of repurchasing companies underperformed 
the index, and it appears that in this case, the portfolio of repurchasing companies was more 
volatile than the index. A possible cause of the underperformance is due to the behavior of 
biotechnology companies that more often than not, will use cash to invest in research in 
development rather than repurchasing shares. The biotechnology industry in the healthcare sector 
had significant growth over the 10 year period.  
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Exhibit 9: Healthcare Sector GICS=35: Value of $100
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 The financial sector is one of the more interesting sectors examined. Exhibit 10 shows 
that the portfolio of repurchasing companies outperformed the financial index. This was 
especially true after the financial crisis. A possible explanation for this would be, that financial 
companies that had healthier balance sheets and business models were able to repurchase shares 
when the market valuation was low, while the financial index has positions in both healthy and 
unhealthy companies. The unhealthy companies could explain the minimal growth post financial 
crisis of the financial sector index.   
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 The technology sector repurchasers marginally underperformed the sector index peer. 
The behavior of the technology sector in regards to repurchases are a factor. A technology 
company would most likely use excess cash to invest in research and development rather than 
returning cash to shareholders. More mature technology companies that make up a large portion 
of the technology ETF are the ones that would be more likely to repurchase shares; which leads 
to the close tracking of the repurchase portfolio and the ETF shares.  
 
Exhibit 12 shows that the Utility repurchasing companies underperformed the utility 
index. Utility companies are more likely to issue a cash dividend to distribute excess cash rather 
than repurchasing shares. In addition, utility companies are regulated heavily in regards to return 
on equity and pricing of their product.  
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Exhibit 12: Utility Sector GICS=55: Value of $100
UTILITY Repurchasers UTILITY INDEX
16 
 
Comparison of Performance Metric Tables 
 
Exhibit 13: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 14: 
 
Annualized 
 
10 Year Geometric Mean Return 
Sector 
 
Share Repurchase Portfolio Index Difference 
S&P 
 
2.972% 2.936% 0.035% 
S&P ex Financials 
 
3.233% 4.293% -1.060% 
Energy 
 
1.632% 8.103% -6.470% 
Materials 
 
7.765% 5.037% 2.728% 
Industrials 
 
2.519% 6.177% -3.658% 
Consumer Discretionary 
 
6.393% 7.881% -1.488% 
Consumer Staples 
 
4.774% 7.706% -2.933% 
Healthcare 
 
5.276% 9.156% -3.880% 
Financials 
 
6.593% -4.103% 10.696% 
Technology 
 
6.157% 6.954% -0.797% 
Utilities 
 
-1.897% 3.461% -5.359% 
Annualized 10 Year Money Weighted Return 
Sector Share Repurchase Portfolio 
S&P 7.822% 
S&P ex Financials 8.743% 
Energy 9.280% 
Materials 7.526% 
Industrials 13.097% 
Consumer Discretionary 7.039% 
Consumer Staples 11.581% 
Healthcare 5.055% 
Financials 7.143% 
Technology 3.550% 
Utilities 9.460% 
Exhibit 15: 
 
Comparison of Performance Metrics 
Exhibits 13, 14 and 15 are comparing the geometric and arithmetic means, and 
presenting the money-weighted return respectively. The second column of each exhibit is for the 
portfolio of repurchasing companies, the third column is the return of the index, and if the 
difference is negative, the repurchasing portfolio underperformed the index.  
 Exhibit 13 shows the S&P 500 portfolio of repurchasing companies marginally 
outperformed the S&P 500 index. This is mainly due to the outperformance of the repurchasing 
companies of the financial sector of the S&P 500. One possible explanation of the 
outperformance is after the financial crisis, financial companies that had healthier balance sheets 
and healthier company performance had the ability to repurchase shares when the entire market 
value of the financial sector was low. To examine the impact of the financial sector on the 
comparison of the S&P 500 portfolio of repurchases vs. the S&P 500 index the financial sector 
was removed from the calculation of returns. Exhibit 13 and 15 show the repurchase portfolio of 
S&P 500 excluding financials greatly underperformed the S&P 500 index excluding financials.  
Annualized 10 Year Arithmetic Mean Return 
Sector Share Repurchase Portfolio Index Difference t-stat (diff) p-value 
S&P 1.076% 0.921% 0.155% -0.156 0.438 
S&P ex Financials 0.963% 1.379% -0.416% -0.414 0.599 
Energy 0.868% 2.671% -1.803% -0.761 0.226 
Materials 2.207% 1.902% 0.305% 0.209 0.418 
Industrials 1.005% 2.042% -1.037% -0.604 0.275 
Consumer Discretionary 1.763% 2.325% -0.562% -0.541 0.296 
Consumer Staples 1.287% 2.062% -0.775% -0.607 0.274 
Healthcare 1.539% 2.404% -0.865% -1.100 0.139 
Financials 2.211% 0.233% 1.978% 0.972 0.169 
Technology 1.676% 2.075% -0.399% -0.300 0.383 
Utilities -0.178% 1.086% -1.264% -0.742 0.231 
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 While examining the arithmetic annualized returns in exhibit 16, the p-values indicate 
that the t-statistics are statistically insignificant; which leads to the conclusion that the null-
hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
 Another sector that should be highlighted is the energy sector. The energy portfolio of 
repurchases greatly underperformed the index; this could be due to the time period being 
examined experienced increasing energy prices. Energy companies, instead of repurchasing 
shares, invested capital into higher yielding physical assets, and the increase in share price is not 
captured in the repurchase portfolio.  
Comparison of Risk Metrics Table 
Exhibit 16: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of Risk Metrics  
Exhibit 16 compares the standard deviation and the semi-deviation of the repurchase 
portfolio to those of the index portfolio. In most cases, the standard deviation and the semi-
deviation of the share repurchase portfolio are lower which means that the share repurchase 
portfolio has a lower volatility than the index peers.  
Annualized 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
Semi-Deviation  
Sector 
 
Portfolio Index Ratio 
 
Portfolio Index Ratio 
S&P 
 
0.059 0.080 74% 
 
0.059 0.071 83% 
S&P ex Financials 
 
0.056 0.078 72% 
 
0.055 0.071 78% 
Energy 
 
0.096 0.116 83% 
 
0.053 0.073 72% 
Materials 
 
0.077 0.111 69% 
 
0.072 0.099 72% 
Industrials 
 
0.084 0.101 83% 
 
0.075 0.078 96% 
Consumer Discretionary 
 
0.063 0.09 70% 
 
0.042 0.068 62% 
Consumer Staples 
 
0.048 0.061 78% 
 
0.038 0.044 86% 
Healthcare 
 
0.069 0.062 112% 
 
0.058 0.04 144% 
Financials 
 
0.109 0.155 70% 
 
0.084 0.108 78% 
Technology 
 
0.058 0.086 67% 
 
0.044 0.059 74% 
Utilities 
 
0.076 0.067 114% 
 
0.051 0.052 99% 
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Comparison of Risk Adjusted Performance Metrics Tables 
Exhibit 17: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 18: 
Annualized Sortino Ratio 
Sector Portfolio Index Difference 
S&P -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
S&P ex Financials 0.01 0.16 -0.15 
Energy -0.29 0.67 -0.96 
Materials 0.64 0.19 0.45 
Industrials -0.09 0.38 -0.47 
Consumer Discretionary 0.77 0.69 0.08 
Consumer Staples 0.42 1.02 -0.60 
Healthcare 0.36 1.48 -1.12 
Financials 0.41 -0.68 1.08 
Technology 0.67 0.63 0.04 
Utilities -0.99 0.05 -1.04 
    
 
 
 
 
Annualized Sharpe Ratio 
Sector Portfolio Index Difference 
S&P -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
S&P ex Financials 0.01 0.14 -0.13 
Energy -0.16 0.42 -0.58 
Materials 0.59 0.17 0.43 
Industrials -0.08 0.30 -0.38 
Consumer Discretionary 0.51 0.52 -0.02 
Consumer Staples 0.33 0.74 -0.41 
Healthcare 0.30 0.97 -0.67 
Financials 0.31 -0.47 0.78 
Technology 0.51 0.44 0.08 
Utilities -0.67 0.04 -0.71 
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Exhibit 19: 
Annualized Fama-French Alpha 
Sector Portfolio Index Difference 
S&P -1.77% 0.00% -1.77% 
S&P ex Financials -1.25% 1.97% -3.23% 
Energy -4.67% 12.42% -17.09% 
Materials 3.15% 0.29% 2.85% 
Industrials -3.28% 6.94% -10.22% 
Consumer Discretionary 3.01% 1.54% 1.47% 
Consumer Staples 2.98% 8.97% -5.99% 
Healthcare 0.42% 5.51% -5.10% 
Financials 0.48% -6.36% 6.84% 
Technology 3.22% 7.50% -4.28% 
Utilities -5.20% 3.96% -9.17% 
 
Comparison of Risk Adjusted Performance Metrics 
Similar to the comparison of performance metrics table, the comparison of risk adjusted 
performance metrics is set up the in the same format. Exhibits 17, 18, and 19 are examining the 
Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, and Fama-French alpha respectively. In the difference column, results 
that are negative have the repurchase portfolio underperforming the index portfolio. Examining 
exhibit 19, the energy sector greatly underperformed the index when comparing Fama-French 
alpha. As explained before, this could be due to the fact energy companies invested in higher 
yielding assets rather than repurchasing shares.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the data collected does not support the alternative hypothesis, and in seven out of nine 
sector cases, the repurchase portfolio underperforms the comparison index. However, it is 
interesting to see that the repurchase portfolio is also less volatile than the index. When looking 
at risk adjusted returns, the repurchase portfolio still underperforms the index; and therefore the 
lower volatility does not compensate fully for the lower return performance.  
21 
 
Additional research should be completed by expanding the time series to greater than 10 years, 
and sub-sectors should be examined. For example, the healthcare sector contains a broad range 
of businesses from biotechnology to senior living facilities. In addition to the S&P 500, perhaps 
the data should be expanded into small market capitalization firms as well. Small-cap managers 
may have an advantage in repurchasing shares at a lower market value due to the market not 
being as efficient in that realm.  
Share repurchase announcements and actual share repurchase metrics should be examined 
further when looking to allocate capital into the equity market. When a company repurchases 
shares when market value is at all-time highs the company could be misusing cash that could be 
used for dividends or acquisitions. Perhaps companies can use cash typically used to repurchase 
shares, but purchase a SPDR ETF instead that could generate additional income for shareholders. 
A final suggestion for future research would be to integrate managers’ actions concerning share 
issuances as well as share repurchases. This would allow for a fuller analysis of managers’ buy 
and sell actions in response to possible overvaluation and undervaluation of their firms’ shares. 
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